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Legislative Update:
Amending the Illinois Felony Murder Provision: Is It Enough?
Nicole Pijon*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early morning hours of August 13, 2019, a seventy-five-year-old resident
was awoken by headlights shining near the driveway of his secluded home in Old Mill
Creek, a small town in northern Illinois, just five miles south of the Wisconsin border.
After noticing several individuals approach his car, the resident-loaded gun in hand
exited his house to investigate. As the group moved towards him, he noticed an object in
one of the stranger's hands and, out of fear, fired shots in their direction. One of the bullets
struck and killed the youngest of the group of six, fourteen-year-old Ja'quan Swopes.
Two days later, the Lake County State's Attorney announced adult murder
charges-not against the shooter, but rather against the teenagers accompanying Ja' quan
on that fateful night, whom the news media subsequently dubbed the "Lake County Five."
Initial reactions to the charges were uniform: community members, parents, and juvenile
law experts alike were outraged by the filing decision. Media attention and public backlash
brought to light the broad reach of Illinois' felony murder provision, prompting questions
as to its soundness. How can someone be chargedwith murder when he or she did not pull
the trigger? In contrast to the laws of most states, the Illinois felony murder rule long
operated on a theory of proximate cause, as opposed to one of agency. As a result,
participants in a forcible felony offense could be charged with murder for any resulting
death, regardless of who was the but-for cause.
The Lake County Five generated an unprecedented amount of controversy. In
response to heightened public scrutiny and criticism from his chief political opponent for
reelection, the Lake County State's Attorney dismissed the charges a month later,
transferring the four youngest back to the local juvenile court. Nonetheless, the juveniles'
reprieve from murder charges and resolution of their conduct in a juvenile forum marks the
exception, not the rule. The Lake County Five were neither the first nor the last group of
young offenders to be prosecuted for a killing committed by a third-party.
The case sparked discourse over the state's felony murder provision, propelling
House Bill 1615 to the forefront of juvenile justice reform discussions. The bill proposed
amending the Illinois first-degree murder statute by eliminating deaths caused by third
parties as a ground for felony murder prosecution-the first of its kind to advocate for the
adoption of an agency approach. Despite collecting strong support, the bill never saw the
light of day; the COVID-19 pandemic halted the General Assembly's endeavors in March
2020. The legislature, however, revived its efforts by including the felony murder
amendment provided for in House Bill 1615 in a broader, more comprehensive reform
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package, House Bill 3653. It advanced quickly through both houses, and Governor J.B.
Pritzker signed the landmark bill into law on February 22, 2021.
This article describes Illinois' original felony murder provision, demonstrating its
use to unfairly prosecute juvenile offenders, and addresses the implications of converting
to an agency theory. It embraces House Bill 3653, but contends that its adoption will
nevertheless prove inadequate to protect youth from prosecutorial overreach in absence of
an absolute felony murder exception for juveniles.
II.

AGENCY VS. PROXIMATE CAUSE: WHO CAN THE STATE CHARGE?

Although states remain divided on the nuances of felony murder, all but six have a
codified variant of the doctrine. Twenty-five states follow an agency theory, while
nineteen-including Illinois, until this year-have adopted a proximate cause approach.
While the distinctions between these two positions are striking, both impose liability on
the basis of strict liability.
Under a proximate cause theory of felony murder, all participants in a felony are
held accountable for any deaths that result, including those caused by third parties.
Conversely, the agency approach to felony murder is notably narrower; a state may impose
criminal liability only for deaths a defendant or his co-defendant caused during the
commission of a felony. This theory of accountability mirrors the common law rule and
comports with traditional understandings of culpability, at least with respect to adult
offenders. It presumes that "the hand of one is the hand of all" for purposes of criminal
responsibility.
The state of Illinois embraced the controversial proximate cause theory of felony
murder for nearly 200 years, until the adoption of House Bill 3653. Prior to the bill, an
individual could be charged with first-degree murder for a killing they neitherintended nor
caused, so long as the death occurred during "the attempt or commission of a forcible
felony other than second-degree murder." In other words, the felony-murder provision
widened the scope of the first-degree murder statute by expanding its application to
accidental deaths and deaths caused by third parties. Participants in the predicate forcible
felony could thus be charged for deaths caused by victims, police officers, or bystanders.
It was, in effect, a form of vicarious liability.
Illinois' felony murder provision was broader than other states employing the
proximate cause approach in two respects. First, the language required only that the death
occur during the attempt or commission of a forcible felony. This "during" requirement
focused on the temporal relationship between the underlying felony and the death. Most
other states have narrowed their statutes to apply exclusively to deaths occurring in
furtherance of the commission of the crime-that is, the killing was done to advance or
facilitate the underlying felony. Second, while Illinois enumerates particular crimes that
constitute forcible felonies, it opened the door for broad application by defining them to
include any "felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against
any individual."
The proximate cause theory of felony murder is analogous to the concept of tort
liability. The Illinois Supreme Court has reasoned that when a defendant's "attempt to
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commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been
within his contemplation," he should be held responsible for any resulting death. This
notion of foreseeability should, in principle, function to curb the severity of the felony
murder doctrine. But by determining that accidental deaths or deaths caused by third parties
should be within one's contemplation, any protective impact of the foreseeability
requirement is effectively nullified. In fact, Illinois' highest court has noted that a defendant
is not required to contemplate that his actions would result specifically in death.
Support for this theory of felony murder hinges on its purported deterrent value.
The threat of severe punishment for first-degree murder, it is argued, discourages wouldbe offenders from engaging in the underlying, unlawful conduct. However, this rationale
presumes that would-be offenders, including youth as young as thirteen, understand the
full breadth of the felony murder rule. Opponents also challenge the deterrence justification
on the basis that a co-defendant lacks control over the actions of third parties.
Following House Bill 3653, third-party nonparticipants are no longer eligible for
charges under the felony murder provision. A key portion of the amendment, however, was
ultimately excluded from the larger reform package. The amendment, as originally drafted
in House Bill 1615, called for revisions to Illinois' accountability statute, which imposes
liability on an accomplice who solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid a defendant
in the planning or commission of an offense. Had the amendment adhered to its original
language, it would have required the element of knowledge for an accomplice to be held
liable for the defendant's actions. In other words, it would have limited the felony murder
provision further by allowing for prosecution if, and only if, an accomplice was aware that
the defendant would engage in conduct likely to result in great bodily harm or death.
III.

APPLICATION OF FELONY MURDER TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS

A. Due Process Concerns
A basic tenet of criminal jurisprudence is that the government must prove a
defendant's mens rea ("guilty mind") beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction.
Requiring proof of criminal intent safeguards from prosecutorial overreach and
unwarranted convictions. Although the agency approach limits the scope of felony murder
to only the participants in an underlying offense, it nonetheless suffers from the same defect
as the proximate cause theory: it substantially eases the state's burden of proof in criminal
prosecutions.
Prosecution for first-degree murder requires evidence of specific intent, meaning
that the government must show "that the defendant acted with the intent to kill the victim
or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm"; however, felony murder does not. Instead, the government need only demonstrate
that the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for the predicate felony, such as robbery
or burglary, and that the felony was conducted with an "independent felonious purpose"
other than the killing itself. In other words, the forcible felony must not be inherent in the
act of murder itself. Proof that a defendant attempted to or committed the predicate felony,
in effect, creates a conclusive presumption of guilt for murder. It is for this reason
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opponents contend that the proximate cause theory runs afoul of due process by
impermissibly lowering the state's burden of proof and allowing for prosecution in the
absence of the necessary criminal intent.
These due process implications are of particular concern in the context of juvenile
delinquency. By reducing the state's burden of proof, the felony murder provision dilutes
procedural protections over the state's most vulnerable population and operates in tandem
with the state's transfer provisions to serve as a direct avenue to adult court prosecution. If
the state files a delinquency petition against a juvenile for charges relating to felony
murder, the adult criminal court may assume jurisdiction by one of three ways.
First, the juvenile court judge may waive a juvenile as young as thirteen to criminal
court for any felony pursuant to the state's discretionary transfer provision. Second, if
probable cause exists to believe a juvenile aged fifteen years or older has committed a
forcible felony, Illinois law creates a presumption that the juvenile is not a fit and proper
subject for juvenile court services. Only juveniles previously adjudicated or found guilty
of a forcible felony committed in furtherance of criminal activity by an organized gang are
subject to this presumptive transfer mechanism. If these conditions are satisfied, the burden
shifts to the juvenile to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. If the
juvenile is unable to show amenability to rehabilitation, the case will be transferred to adult
criminal court for prosecution.
Third, the state may prosecute a juvenile under the extended juvenile jurisdiction
(EJJ) statute, so long as the juvenile is at least thirteen years of age and is alleged to have
committed a felony. Unlike discretionary and presumptive transfers which result in a
complete and final transfer of jurisdiction, EJJ is an alternative form of prosecution that
uniquely provides for concurrent jurisdictional authority over a minor. The juvenile court
imposes both a juvenile and adult sentence, but the latter sentence is stayed and vacated on
the condition that the juvenile sentence is successfully completed. If a minor commits a
new offense before completing his sentence, juvenile jurisdiction is automatically
terminated and the adult sentence is triggered. Should a minor violate the conditions of his
juvenile sentence, regardless of how technical that violation may be, it is within the juvenile
court's discretion to revoke the stay of the adult sentence.
The felony murder doctrine works in concert with each of the above transfer
mechanisms to pave the way for adult prosecution for felony murder or the underlying
forcible felony and reduce the prosecutor's burden once in criminal court. The
discretionary transfer provision, in particular, is illustrative: for a juvenile as young as
thirteen to be criminally prosecuted for first-degree murder, the state need only prove that
the juvenile participated in the predicate felony to achieve conviction. Indeed, state
prosecutors continue to take advantage of this reduced burden.
In presuming that juveniles are capable of forming the identical mens rea as their
adult counterparts, the felony murder doctrine ignores the developmental context of
adolescent crime. Juvenile offenders, by virtue of their youth, are less culpable. Mounting
research confirms that neurobiological systems governing emotional regulation, impulse
control, foresight, and evaluation of risks, are underdeveloped in the adolescent brain.
Juveniles not only have difficulties contemplating the consequences of their own conduct,
but also those of other people. This is a critical consideration in evaluating the policy
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behind prosecuting youth for felony murder. Juveniles are malleable, and should be treated
as such. Criminal behavior is typically the result of a complex combination of internal
factors and environmental influences. Delinquency-even involving violent, dangerous
conduct-cannot be viewed in a vacuum.
B. Disproportional Impact on Youth of Color
Importantly, the severity of the felony murder doctrine not only disproportionately
affects juvenile offenders, but particularly those of color. Due to a lack of comprehensive
data collection, the total number of juveniles serving criminal sentences for felony murder
or underlying felonies in Illinois remains unknown. Available data, however, reveals that
the juvenile justice system is flawed at its core; Black youth have disproportionate contact
with the juvenile justice system at all stages. More than 70% of juveniles committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice are Black, despite the fact that Black youth comprise only
15% of the state's population. Although overall rates of admission to detention centers are
decreasing, the overrepresentation of Black youth persists. The same holds true for transfer
decisions and EJJ prosecutions. In 2016, 124 juveniles were transferred to adult court in
twenty-four Illinois counties; the state's other seventy-eight counties have not disclosed
their data. Of those 124 known cases, 65% were Black. In turn, Black youth are likewise
overrepresented in the Illinois Department of Corrections.
The felony murder doctrine in itself, especially when based on a proximate cause
theory, undermines the rehabilitative purpose of Illinois' juvenile justice system by
obliterating due process protections and paving the way for unnecessary criminalization of
youth. Although adoption of an agency theory narrows charging eligibility, the statute will
nevertheless continue to reach youth unfit for adult prosecution.
IV.

HOUSE BILL

3653: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

House Bill 3653 advanced through the General Assembly with exceptional support,
but was also met with strong opposition regarding its other, more controversial portions
namely, those eliminating cash bail and imposing additional police accountability
measures. Fortunately, the contention surrounding these parts ultimately did not defeat
conversion to an agency theory of felony murder.
The bill proposed two key changes to shift the state to a theory of agency. First, it
restricted initiation of felony murder charges solely for deaths caused by "participants" of
the offense, thereby eliminating liability for deaths resulting from third-party actions.
Second, deaths must occur "in the course of and in furtherance of' the underlying forcible
felonies. This causation limitation is considerably narrower than the provision's prior
"during" requirement. By requiring killings to be in furtherance of, the amendment
necessitates a close nexus between the felonious conduct and any resulting death. In short,
it follows traditional notions of reasonable foreseeability.
Holding individuals accountable for deaths caused by third parties was unsound
policy, rooted in flawed rationales that conflict with basic concepts of culpability.
Modifying the Illinois felony murder provision to reflect an agency theory of liability is a
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step in the right direction, and it aligns the state with the majority of jurisdictions. Even so,
the agency theory brings its own challenges, allowing for a juvenile to be prosecuted for
the acts of his accomplices, without distinguishing between intentional and accidental
deaths or considering developmental factors.
In the absence of an absolute felony murder exception, juvenile offenders remain
vulnerable to adult court transfer and prosecution for felony murder or the underlying
forcible felony at a reduced burden of proof. Categorically excluding youth from the
doctrine promotes the state's objective of rehabilitating and protecting its youth.
V.

CONCLUSION

The felony murder doctrine persists as a major concern in the state's juvenile justice
policy, enabling unwarranted criminalization of youth, particularly those of color.
Effective accountability demands developmentally-appropriate treatment, not decades
behind bars. Youth are entitled to the most stringent protections of the law, yet remain
subject to reduced prosecutorial burdens for felony murder. A juvenile felony murder
exception is necessary to show that Illinois youth have value in the eyes of the law.
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